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Appearing below are excerpts from parts of an interview conducted in January by the Boston
chapter of Science for Nicaragua Committee with British economist Robert Sutcliffe. Most recently
a visiting professor at the University of Massachusetts (Amherst), Sutcliffe has published widely
on questions of development and economic crisis. His latest book, "The Profit System," was coauthored with Francis Green. At the time of the interview, Sutcliffe had recently returned from
a year of teaching in the Sociology Department of the Universidad Centroamericana (UCA). The
interview is focused on his experiences in Nicaragua, and that country's economic problems. [From
the Science for Nicaragua newsletter, distributed by the Central America Resource Network, Palo
Alto, Calif. (Subscriptions to the newsletter can be obtained by writing Science for Nicaragua
Committee, Science for the People, 897 Main St., Cambridge, MA 02139.)] SN: Let's start by talking
about your background as an economist, and how your work in other countries might be relevant
to what you saw in Nicaragua. Sutcliffe: I've always specialized in development economics, and
in that sense I've always been interested in the Third World. I worked in Cuba for a year or so, in
the Ministry of Forests. I've done a few short-term consultancies in Guinea-Bissau and Peru. And
then a long time ago, before I was an economist, I worked in what is now Zambia and Zimbabwe,
in a social research institute; that's what really got me interested in the first place in economics.
decided that I would much prefer to be a teacher than to be an economic consultant or adviser...for
two reasons. One is that the nature of [Nicaragua's] economic problems was so huge that there
was no correct advice that anybody could give... much more important that Third World countries
develop their own technical professional resources. The people who give economic advice which
affects the lives of other people should be in some way politically answerable to the societies in
which they live. In that sense, it's more important to teach people in Nicaragua to be economists
than to go and be an economist. I don't want to disparage the work of anyone who's working [in
Nicaragua] as an economist, but I think that's one of the reasons why if you can make a contribution
by teaching, it's a very useful contribution. SN: Was this principle on which you based your decision
to teach confirmed by your experience in Nicaragua? Sutcliffe: ...I certainly confirmed that I was
glad I was not responsible for making any economic policy! production is falling, productivity
is falling,...hyper- inflation, people are leaving productive jobs and going into unproductive
jobs,...declining...standard of living,... national income, investment. Less and less attention can be
devoted to long-term development projects. More and more the nature of economic policy-making
is simply to survive until...it used to be next month, then it was next week, and now it's probably
tomorrow....[T]he policymakers are increasingly confined to a small number of alternatives, and lose
control of what happens in the long term by being obliged to control...what happens in the short
term. I do not think Nicaragua is special in that sense... [Y]ou can find this tendency in just about
all countries of the Third World. It is intensified in Nicaragua because of the war and a number of
other factors. Because of the aggression, the political emergency, the consequences of the revolution
and so on, one sees this...closing of the horizon...which exists in many other countries of the Third
World...Third world economics is more and more emergency planning. In Nicaragua [the short©2011 The University of New Mexico,
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term view] is largely due to the war. In some other countries it is an outcome of famine conditions.
In others, it is because of other kinds of wars, international wars, civil wars, or because of the debt
crisis...[D]evelopment economics as...a way of outlining long-term plans for whole countries more or
less dead. There are very few countries where it really operates. It operates in China and India, but
in the vast majority of African countries, most South American countries, most Central American
countries, and especially in Nicaragua, it does not operate at all any more. Governments decide a
policy today in order to survive for a week, and maybe in a week they change the policy because
it does not work or because there is some new emergency. That's a general development within
the world, from which Nicaragua suffers especially for a number of reasons. One is because it's
an export-oriented economy that produces crops for which the market is almost universally bad.
This is a phenomenon which has nothing to do with the war or the revolution...It has been made
much worse because of the war, since [Nicaraguans] have to stop producing even disappointing
export crops in [several] areas...The fact is that three exports have...almost [disappeared] because
of the war: fish, or shellfish mostly, which was quite profitable; gold, because the mines are in areas
which see big contra incursions, and forestry. [A]lthough none of those was a major export, they all
were a means of diversifying exports from the old traditional crops...[T]he the world market. The
second factor concerns the direct and indirect effects of the war itself. The direct effects mean that
production in some areas has been shut down due to contra incursions. The indirect effects mean
that the government spends half its budget on the military, and a great deal of other public outlays
is indirectly related to military spending. Consequently, a large amount of what the government
spends is non-productive in the economic sense. That's one of the major sources for inflation, which
then produces another indirect effect. If you have hyperinflation, then real wages fall extremely
rapidly. [I]t becomes no longer rational to work in productive jobs with a fixed wage. In order to live
people are obliged to get involved in some market activity of their own, i.e., the so-called informal
sector. Nobody in Nicaragua can live without being involved in that sector in some way or other,
at least through family, connections or whatever...No one in Nicaragua can live on the Nicaraguan
wage. This means that everybody is forced to do something else...causing problems of absenteeism,
of people leaving their jobs, people moving from productive work into unproductive work. Not
that all the informal sector is unproductive, but nonetheless a lot of it is, because it involves finding
yourself a little space in distributing a proportion of the value which is produced somewhere or
other. This is another area in which the war indirectly produces problems. I'll give you an example
of the wage question. I was in a friend's car and we gave a ride to a 9-year-old boy whose daily
activity was to go to the market and buy a box of 100 pieces of chicle (chewing gum), for 38,000
cordobas. He would then sell each one for 500, and that gave him a sum total of 50,000 per day. That
makes 12,000 per day, which is 360,000 a month, which was a little bit more than the head of the
sociology department at the UCA earns. This type of distortion is universal...[A] 9-year-old boy who
sells one little box of chicle earns more than somebody in a top professional job, or a high-level
professional job... Next, there is the US embargo, which means trade becomes more difficult, it is
more difficult to get loans from international banks, Nicaragua is faced with less generous facilities
from international financial institutions, etc. The US has vetoed a number of loans to Nicaragua.
And it also makes it very difficult to get spare parts for old North American machinery. So that
means they just break down more often and it is very difficult to repair them, etc., and all that has
quite a major effect as well. On top of all of the above, [Nicaragua]...is in a process of major social
and political change, which hardly ever produces immediate short-term increases in economic
development and productivity. It is always disruptive in some economic sense. This is part of the
background which explains why the Nicaraguan economic problem is so great. One cannot say with
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any conviction that there is a policy which would be better than the policies that are being pursued.
You can see numerous ways in which the policies that are pursued lead to economic problems. But
that does not imply that if the government pursued different policies they would avoid economic
problems. It would simply be that a problem that is objectively determined from outside would take
a different shape than the shape that it takes at the moment. At the moment, for example, there is
hyperinflation, with a rapid reduction in real wages, because the government controls the money
wage and does not increase it in line with inflation. Now if the government were to increase the
real wage in line with inflation, which would maintain the real wage, it is hard to say what would
happen. Almost certainly the inflation would be more rapid than it now is. On the other hand it
might to some extent cut down the flow of people from the productive to the unproductive sector...In
any event, it is difficult to predict. This is why economic policymaking at the present time is such
an extremely difficult question. It is another reason why I tend to be skeptical of the function of
economic advisers. What can one say that would make things better? In the end, it's a political
question, an international political question and a national political question. At the moment there's
no way one could make the Nicaraguan economy healthy. The question becomes one of how the
unhealthiness would display itself. SN: Would you say the planners have a good sense of what's
happening on a day-to-day or week-to-week basis? Sutcliffe: That's a difficult question. Some of
them clearly do, but among political leaders there is a tendency toward economic wishful thinking,
to deny some of the really uncomfortable economic realities. There is also a failure to see some of
the interconnections. I'll give you an example of that. At least a year ago, and...to some extent six
months ago, many political leaders were making frequent statements against the informal sector.
But that's unrealistic. When you have a situation where real wages in the formal sector are falling
as fast as they have been, and the real wages are to some extent controlled by the government the
government controls the money wage and can change it if it wants to , then it is not realistic to blame
people for going into the informal sector and saying that they're ducking their revolutionary duties...
[Survival] for many people depends on going into the informal sector... Now there are a number of
intellectuals and a few politicians who are writing in a more accommodating way, displaying even a
more constructive attitude toward the informal sector. The idea is that the informal sector is smallscale traders. There is no reason they should be against the revolution, because the revolution is
a revolution of small people... SN: Is the informal sector providing some services that the formal
sector is unable to provide? Sutcliffe: Absolutely, and particularly in transportation. But the part
of the demand for transportation results from the less productive aspects of the informal sector...
[P]eople often want transportation just simply to move goods from one place to another in order
to get a better price...[T]here's a huge demand for transportation that cannot be met by the formal
sector, because there is not enough investment...So anybody who has a van converts it into a means
of livelihood. It is a very good means of livelihood in Nicaragua. One can earn far more driving a
van around than in any normal salaried job. SN: What kind of informal activity would a high-level
professional typically be involved in? Sutcliffe: Professionals are more likely to be in a position
where they do not have to become involved in the informal sector; they can get money from outside.
Many of the people I knew at this level who remained in their jobs were able to do so because they
had economic support from relatives and friends in the US...I saw an estimate that the inflow of
funds from relatives to support families in Nicaragua was something over $300 million...about the
same as total Soviet aid. [T]he Nicaraguan economy survives, in a sense, because of Nicaraguan
relatives in the US, [aid from] the Soviet government and a few other governments in the East.
[T]hey're about equal in terms of overall significance. One goes to the state, and the other goes to
individuals. [Money from the outside] is crucial to survival. Many families have a deliberate strategy
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of sending the most likely member to the US to earn money and send it back. A member of the
family is chosen to go, and his/her duty is to send as much money as possible back. It means that
families in Nicaragua can survive, but it has the further consequence that the people who are most
likely to be able to earn money in the US are probably, in an objective sense, the most skilled people.
So the survival strategy is also a brain drain strategy. It is a brain drain decided at that end, but
conditions which dictate it are created at this end. SN: What's happening with Western European
aid? Sutcliffe: It is very small in aggregate terms, compared to what [Nicaragua receives] from the
Soviet Union. This is not to say it does not make a difference, since it does and directly, toward
particular projects. The real role of Western Europe in the Nicaraguan economy is that it takes
Nicaraguan exports, as a substitute for the United States. Western Europe is now the biggest market
for Nicaraguan primary product exports. This is important in the sense that the Western Europeans
have not followed the US in implementing the embargo. But this role does not supply many imports:
imports come from the East, and exports go to the West. Most of what Nicaragua receives from the
East is on credit; petroleum, for example. If [Nicaragua] had to pay for the oil, it would be a total
catastrophe. Part of the aid then is the credit which allows Nicaragua to obtain petroleum. Petroleum
imports last year were just slightly less than the total value of all exports. So if Nicaragua had to pay
for all, one could say that all export earnings would have been used to pay for just one commodity.
SN: How do Nicaraguan economists see the country developing? What is the role of the university in
this, both in teaching economics and in training people? Then, how is it anticipated that the experts
trained in the universities can participate in development and to what extent is this happening?
Sutcliffe: Nearly all Nicaraguan economists at present are obsessed with short-term problems,
like questions of food supply, how to pay wages when the government does not actually have
enough cordoba bills. [Ed. note: Sutcliffe was interviewed before the currency reform in February.]
Previously, they had been thinking about longer-term problems. Number one is the desire to reduce
Nicaragua's dependency on the outside. It is a bit ironic to look at a program of outside assistance
in the context of that desire, but obviously dependency on the outside cannot be reduced without
changing its nature. This is where voluntary organizations such as Science for the People become
very important. One of the aspects of dependency and there are many is exporting primary products
to foreign markets as the only source of income. This can be changed in the very long term by
changing the productive structure, which is a very hard thing to do...[I]n some cases, a [professional
training] program can contribute to this objective, because more scientific knowledge,...technicians,
will enable a country to transform its productive structure more readily...[I]n that sense, one can
say technical and scientific assistance is related to a long-term development strategy. [Another
aspect of dependency]...is to be dependent on outside assistance from governments. Normally
governments are rather conservative and bureaucratic institutions, and it seems to me that...if
the nature of outside assistance could be changed from states to voluntary and more progressive
organizations, this would represent a beneficial change. There's a huge literature on how so-called
foreign assistance is not foreign assistance for development, but rather a means of tying countries
to a continual dependence. In this regard, a program which is not attached to an imperialist state,
but which is able to tap the kind of scientific and technical resources available within the imperialist
[country], could actually be very important [in promoting non-dependent development]...If you look
around the world at development projects, the best ones are those which are not routed through
governments. They are not a part of the foreign policy of states, but are more specifically related to
development needs. On experts, I want to express some skepticism...[I]n Nicaragua..., the economy
has suffered so much in the last 20 years from earthquake, war, civil war, imperialist attack, etc.,
that...the most important thing to do is reconstruction. Getting people to reuse skills that they have
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already used in the past, getting the economy to do things that it was doing 20 years ago, but which
it no longer can accomplish...[A] lot of the skills are already there, but they're being wasted. For
instance, I met a doctor who had given up working in the hospital because he could earn more
money selling fruit and vegetables in the Mercado Oriental. Now there is somebody who has been
trained in universities, in Nicaragua and then probably in the US, whose training is completely
useless in the present situation...[T]hus, to some extent, training professionals is not the key issue.
Rather, the problem is one of changing the economic structure, or restoring an economic structure in
which professionals, trained people, university graduates, can do useful productive work or, that it
becomes rational for them to do useful productive work. A related problem is that at present people
are being trained in universities who, if things continue as they are, will leave Nicaragua. SN: You
said the need for them is to reconstruct, rather than train professionals. But who is going to perform
the job of reconstruction? Sutcliffe: ...Clearly it would be desirable to see that doctor working in the
Mercado Oriental return to the hospital..., and to see a lot of people return from the US to work in
Nicaragua at useful jobs as professionals, including as university teachers. If this could be done,
it implies a context in which one can start thinking about long-term development...But, training
and employing professionals is not really part of the short-term problem. I do not believe that if
Nicaragua had many more trained economists, short-term economic problems would be resolved.
The problem is not one of organization and knowledge. Rather, it is an objective social and political
problem... An example is trying to end hyperinflation. As long as the Nicaraguan government is
required to directly and indirectly spend lots of money on the military because of the war, it cannot
undertake rational fiscal and monetary policies to cut hyperinflation without endangering the
war effort... Once the war ends, perhaps by being able to reduce military spending, then certain
policies might work to end hyperinflation. At that time, I think, a number of technical problems start
emerging that professionals can really assist with. Next, it does not seem to me that professionals as
such have the answers to problems. But professionals within a context of political democracy and
self-management, where they are answerable to other people constitutes a different situation. A
spirit of creating such a situation exists in Nicaragua, and if this occurs, then professionals would
really come into their own. It is important to stress that "experts" should work in a context in which
they are answerable to the persons affected by their decisions. I have become more and more
skeptical about the idea of experts as such separated from some type of political context. There is
not all that much that an economist is an expert on that is separate from being an expert politician,
an expert interpreter of human needs. The extent to which economic technique alone is necessary is
relatively limited.

-- End --
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